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Small scale digital device forensics is particularly critical as a result of the mobility of these
devices, leading to closer proximity to crimes as they occur when compared to computers.
The Windows Surface tablet is one such device, combining tablet mobility with familiar
Microsoft Windows productivity tools. This research considers the acquisition and forensic
analysis of the Windows Surface RT tablet. We discuss the artifacts of both the Windows
RT operating system and third-party applications. The contribution of this research is to
provide a road map for the digital forensic examination of Windows Surface RT tablets.
ª 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Introduction
The proliferation of smartphones and tablet computers
has significant implications for digital investigations. As the
usage of mobile devices continues to expand, so will the
proportion of digital evidence retrieved from these devices
as compared to computer hard disks. According to
Marturana et al. (2011) and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) (2001) it is more likely
that law enforcement will encounter a suspect with a
mobile device in his/her possession than a PC or laptop.
Hence studying these devices from a forensic perspective is
an essential task for both researchers and practitioners in
digital forensics. Casey (2013) discussed smartphone
forensic R&D and training, and indicated that the variety of
hardware and operating systems in smartphones makes
the forensic acquisition and analysis of these devices
significantly different from the computers with whichmost
forensic practitioners are familiar. This equally applies to
tablets and other small scale devices, which are equally
heterogeneous as their smartphone cousins. The variety of
file systems, data structures and the number of third party
applications available on some of these devices makes the
realm of digital forensic research a significantly more
complicated environment. This complication is highlighted
by the diversity of research done on different devices as
well as the changes in the operating systems or hardware of
previously studied devices.
This research addresses Windows RT tablets, such as
the Surface RT, from a digital forensic acquisition and
analysis perspective. Windows RT is a variant of the
Windows 8 operating system designed for mobile de-
vices that utilize the ARM architecture. It is optimized for
thin and light PCs that have extended battery life. It is
only available pre-installed on selected tablets and PCs
such as the ASUS VivoTab RT, Dell XPS 10, Lenovo Idea-
Pad Yoga 11, Samsung ATIV Tab, and Surface RT. Win-
dows RT only runs built-in apps or apps that are
downloaded from the Windows Store, while other apps
such as Adobe Photoshop, and legacy programs that run
on the regular Windows operating system cannot run on
it. However, Windows RT still has a limited desktop
mode where the user can use redesigned office appli-
cations such as Word, Excel and PowerPoint as well as
exploring and arranging folders in a manner similar to
the regular desktop mode.
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This paper identifies a forensically sound acquisition
method for a Windows RT device, and describes the file
system structure and potential forensic artifacts. It is
organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss related
research in small scale digital device forensics, and then in
the Methodology section we discuss our general method-
ology. Followed by the Acquisition section which describes
Windows RT acquisition, then in the Analysis section we
discuss analysis of acquired Windows RT images. This
paper concludes with a synopsis of findings and planned
future work in this area.
Related work
The field of small scale device forensics has challenged
researchers because thediversityofhardwareandoperating
systems of these devices requires different methods of
forensic acquisition and analysis. According to Casey (2013)
this is shown in “The effects of switching the cameramodule
from Blackberry Curve 9360 devices” by Gisolf et al., which
deals with the changes in the hardware of Blackberry Curve
9360 devices. As well with the work of Quick & Choo who
investigated the artifacts left by Dropbox on a Windows 7
computerandanApple iPhone3Ghence study the effect of a
third party application and its relation to the cloud (Casey,
2013 Gisolf et al., 2013, Quick and Choo, 2013).
As a new tablet operating system, Windows RT has
gained the interest of a number of researchers. According
to reports, a hacker named C.L. Rokr (clrokr) has found a
way to bypass the code integrity checking in Windows RT
which allows users to run unsigned code on Surface tab-
lets and other devices, effectively jailbreaking the plat-
form (Windows RT jailbroken, 2013). This approach could
also be utilized for forensic acquisition of these devices.
The method is possible because most of the Windows RT
code has been ported directly from Windows 8. This
porting included a byte in the kernel that sets the mini-
mum signing level for code execution. On Windows 8, this
is set to 0 so that any code can be run, but on Windows RT,
it is set to 8, meaning that code must be signed by
Microsoft in order to run. Lock and Code Pty Ltd have
developed software that will jailbreak the Windows RT
device using themethod described by clrokr, then use a set
of acquisition tools to acquire an image of the device
(Freestone, 2013).
As mentioned above Windows RT has some similarities
with Windows 8 and as a result, we looked at some of the
work done with regard to this operating system. Amanda
Thomson studied forensic artifacts left on Windows 8
Consumer Preview 32-bit Edition in order to create a guide
book for forensic examiners (Thomson, 2012). Using FTK
Imager v3.0.1 Thomson imaged the VM where Windows 8
is installed and then utilized EnCase Forensic v6.17 for ex-
amination and analysis. The artifacts described by Thomson
included information about Apps that are displayed on the
Metro interface, as well as web cache and cookies specific
to Metro Apps. Around the same time, Ethan Fleisher
investigated the effect of Reset and Refresh function in
Windows 8 (Fleisher, 2012). This feature allows a user to
choose whether or not to reinstall the OS, quickly reset
their entire computer, or thoroughly reset their entire
computer. Hence, the reset operation may cause the ma-
chine to be wiped of all data and for that reason it is
important for digital forensic researchers to investigate the
artifacts left after utilizing this feature. Fleisher was able to
find artifacts indicating that this feature was utilized as
well as other artifacts about the reset or refreshed system.
Kaart, Klaver and van Baar stated that Windows 8,
which is developed to run on mobile devices, such as tab-
lets and phones, as well as on traditional devices such as
laptops and desktop computers, might still have some of
the files from the Windows Phone 7 operating system
(Kaart et al., 2013). In their work they reverse-engineered
significant parts of the EDB (Microsoft Embedded Data-
base) volume format and extensively analyzed the pim.vol
file that contains information related to contacts, appoint-
ments, call history, speed-dial settings and tasks. They also
implemented a parser for the EDB volume format structure
and compared their results to the traditional approach
using an emulator and the API provided by theWindows CE
operating system. The parser was able to recover additional
databases, additional properties per record and unallocated
records. Schaefer, Höfken and Schuba discussed the
acquisition and analysis of a Windows Phone 7 device
(Schaefer et al., 2012). Their work explains the main char-
acteristics of the platform, the problems that forensic in-
vestigators face, methods to circumvent those problems
and a set of tools to get data from the phone. Data that can
be acquired from the phone include the file system, the
registry and active tasks. Based on the file system, further
information such as SMSs, Emails and Facebook data can be
extracted (Schaefer et al., 2012).
From this initial search we identified that there is not
sufficient scientific work that discussesWindows RT tablets
from a digital forensic perspective. The main aim of our
work will be to investigate the artifacts left on the device as
well as acquiring an image of it.
Methodology
The main purpose of this research is to forensically
investigate the Surface RT tablet which runs the Windows
RT operating system. This tablet may contain valuable
forensic artifacts, as it combines the traditional tablet
application environment with common office productivity
applications such as Word, PowerPoint and Excel. Along-
side this is the use of the traditionalWindows Explorer (File
Explorer) available in the regular Windows Operating
System. These desktop-style features in conjunction with
the mobility and the availability of a full size USB port and
MicroSD card, mean that this device may contain a wealth
of forensic artifacts.
As the main purpose of this research is to forensically
investigate the device, ensuring the integrity of the gath-
ered artifacts is an essential requirement. This requirement
is important not only in the case of a forensic investigation
but also for forensic researchers to validate the acquisition
that has been undertaken and the analysis of the acquired
image. For that reason the test and examination procedure
was derived from the Computer Forensics Tool Testing
program guidelines established by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) (2001).
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This section of the paper will discuss the test environ-
ment for this research as well as the requirements to create
such an environment and perform the test. Along with that,
a discussion of the preformed scenario will be detailed
which will assist in determining the expected artifacts that
could be found on the device.
Test environment and requirements
As stated in the NISTguidelines, all the tools and devices
used to create the test environment should be listed.
Detailed below is a list of devices and analysis tools used in
this investigation:
 Microsoft Surface RT device (32 GB)
 Custom data acquisition tool (compiled for Windows RT
on ARM platform)
 Ophcrack (Version 3.6.0)
 Cafae
 Vim Text Editor (Version 7.4a.001)
 Yaru (Version 1.25)
 Mitec Structured Storage Viewer (Version 3.3.1)
 IrfanView (Version 4.36)
Prior to conducting the experiment a lab computer was
set up to run all the analysis tools listed above. All system
applications running on the Surface RT device were
updated after the user account setup. The configuration
was not modified during the setup of the device.
Test procedure
The test procedure consisted of three stages which were
creating a fictional scenario, acquiring an image of the de-
vice and finally analyzing that image.
Scenario
This stage involves conducting common user activity
such as browsing the Internet, using the camera and
uploading images to SkyDrive.
A fictional scenario was developed for the purpose of
conducting the investigation. A Microsoft account was
created using fictional information. This account was
created because installing applications, using SkyDrive
features and sync features require a Microsoft Account.
Table 1 contains the information used for creation of the
account.
After the creation of the account, we performed a
number of “normal” activities on the tablet. Selecting ac-
tivities which we supposed were typical for the device
based on the available applications, we simulated user ac-
tivity on the device. Table 2 shows the simulated user ac-
tivity on the device.
Acquisition
This stage involved the acquisition of an image of the
device using a custom data acquisition tool that was
compiled for Windows RT on the ARM platform. A base
image was acquired after the creation of user account and
this was analyzed for system related artifacts. Our acqui-
sition technique is discussed in section four, below. After
each activity a new image was acquired from the device
Table 1
Information used for the creation of the account.
Input Value
First Name John
Last Name Doe
Email Address m80003052@zu.ac.ae
Password Testing1
Table 2
Activities that were carried out on the device
Application Activity
Internet Explorer (Immersive)  Internet Explorer (Immersive)
 Navigated to link “About ZU” (http://www.zu.ac.ae/main/en/explore_zu/index.aspx)
 Opened a new tab and navigated to slashdot.org
 Favorite the page slashdot.org
Internet Explorer
(Desktop)
 Browsed to google.com
 Browsed to microsoft.com
 Add microsoft.com to favorites
Camera  Took 2 different photos and a video clip.
 Uploaded the photos and video clips to Skydrive
Mail  Setup email access to m80003052@zu.ac.ae
 Accessed an email message
 Composed and sent an email to asif@babariqbal.com
 Subject: My Surface RT, Message: Hello from surface RT
SkyDrive  Created and uploaded a document titled “Document2”
 Downloaded and accessed “Document1.doc” previously uploaded to Skydrive from a different PC
Photos  Downloaded pic1, pic2 and pic3 previously uploaded to Skydrive
 Viewed pic1, pic2, pic3
Music  Listened to a radio station, Artist “coldplay”
 Note: During the process a Microsoft Xbox account was automatically created.
Calendar  Added a new calendar event
Weather  Added a new weather city “Seoul, South Korea”
Bing  Searched for keywords “security”, “forensics” and “digital forensics”
Skype  Added contact “asifiqbal.ai”
 Initiated a text chat session with “asifiqbal.ai”
 Initiated a video chat with “asifiqbal.ai”
Store  Searched for and installed Skype app from the Windows Store
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and compared to the base image, the changes were then
analyzed and reported.
Analysis
This stage involved the analysis of the image acquired
during the acquisition stage. As mentioned above, several
images were created and analyzed, and compared to a base
image. Adescriptionof the analysis and associatedfindings is
provided in the analysis section below.
Acquisition
One of the first steps in any forensic investigation is
acquiring an image of the device. A forensic image is ac-
quired to ensure the integrity of the original evidence.
The acquisition process we employed was accomplished
utilizing a kernel-level vulnerability in theWindows Driver
Signature Enforcement mechanism, which has existed in
Microsoft Windows on the PC for some time now. Since
Windows RT is a port of Windows 8 to the ARM platform.
This vulnerability was also ported to the Surface RT tablet
and was employed by CL Rokr (aka ‘clrokr’) in order to
jailbreak Windows RT (Windowsjailbroken et al., 2013).
The minimum signing level determines how trusted an
executable’s signature is on the scale: Unsigned (0),
Authenticode (4), Microsoft (8), and Windows (12). The
default value on x86 machines is 0, to allow a user to run
anything they like on their computer. On ARM machines,
the default is set to 8. This is not a user setting, but a
hardcoded global value in the kernel itself. It cannot be
changed permanently on devices with UEFI’s (Unified
Extensible Firmware Interface) Secure Boot enabled. It can,
however, be changed in memory.
By adapting the technique mentioned above, the value
of signing level is set to Unsigned (0). This allows execution
of unsigned applications.
We used the Windows Volume Shadow Copy service to
acquire an image of the device’s disk. For this purpose a
Cþþ program was written to use VSS (Volume Shadow
Copy Service) APIs to copy all of the disk’s content.
Analysis
After setting up the user account on the device, a base
image of the device was created. A predefined set of ac-
tivities were then performed on the device, as detailed in
Fig. 1. Ophcrack being used to crack the password of user John’s local and
online account password.
Fig. 2. Setting.db Registry hive file being analyzed in yaru. Path property of
Picture001 is being highlighted.
Fig. 3. Setting.db Registry hive file being analyzed in yaru. Path property of
Video000 is being highlighted.
Fig. 4. Setting.db Registry hive file being analyzed in yaru. PreviewPath
property of Video000 is being highlighted, this property hold full path to
one frame of the video used for preview
Table 3
The structure of metro application data directory.
Directory Content
AC
INetCache The cache file is stored in randomly
named sub-directories. Cache files
retain their original filename and
extension.
INetCookies Cookies are stored in this Directory
with cookies for each website stored
in a single textfile with random name
LocalState This directory can be directly accessed
by the application and can be used to
permanently store any type of data.
Settings Application settings are stored in this
directory as Registry Hive (regf) files.
These files can be analyzed using yaru
A. Iqbal et al. / Digital Investigation 11 (2014) S87–S93S90
Table 2. Apart from activities performed on the device, a
document titled “Document1.doc” was uploaded to the
SkyDrive from a different computer. Three Pictures were
also uploaded to SkyDrive with file names pic1.jpg, pic2.jpg
and pic3.jpg.
Non-Metro application artifacts recovered
One of the interesting artifacts recovered from the
Surface RT tablet was the password of the user’s online and
offline account. We were able to recover this artifact
because the information from the user’s online Microsoft
account is used in the local Windows user account. The
local account also shares the password of the online ac-
count of the user. Since Windows stores password hashes
of the local account in SAM file located in %WINDOWS
%/System32/config directory, the content of this directory
were investigated. The Ophcrack tool was used to decode
the SAM file found on the device, where the password of
the user’s online and offline account was successfully
recovered (see Fig. 1). More complex passwords could be
recovered using the Rainbow tables (Marechal, 2008).
Other useful non-Metro artifacts retrieved from the
device were photos and videos taken on the device itself.
All the photos and videos taken on the device itself were
stored in the (%userprofile%\Pictures\Camera Roll\) direc-
tory, where the variable (%userprofile%) stands for
Fig. 5. Image recovered from the PreviewPath variable mentioned in above.
The image is saved in JPEG format.
Table 4
The data found inside the settings registry hive.
Tree Content
Local State
Captured Items A list of all items captured with the
Camera application.
%Path to image
no slashes%
A single captured item
Path The full path to the image file,
images are stored in jpg format
under %userprofile%\Pictures\Camera Roll\.
%Path to video no slashes%
Path Full path to video file, videos are stored
in mp4 file format under %userprofile%\
Pictures\Camera Roll\.
PreviewPath Path to preview thumbnail to one frame of
the captured video. These images are stored
under %Application Package
Directory%\LocalState\CameraSettings\
PreviewBitmaps\ {random filename} in
JPEG file format.
Fig. 6. File recovered indicating upload of video000.mp4 captured to Pic-
tures directory on Skydrive
Fig. 7. Excerpt from cached file search.htm indicating search for term
“security”.
Fig. 8. Excerpt from cached file search.htm indicating search for term
“digital forensics”.
Fig. 9. Excerpt from cached file search.htm indicating search for term
“forensics”.
Table 5
The structure of “recovery” directory.
Directory Comments
Active
Last Active Data related to tabs open in the last
session of Internet Explorer Desktop
version
Immersive
Active This directory is located under the
Immersive directory
Last Active This directory holds several files stored
with filename %GUID%.dat. All of these
files represent an open tab in last browsing
session.
Apart from these files there is a RecoveryState.
{%GUID%}.dat file which serves to hold the
GUID variable used in each of the files
mentioned above.
The files use Object Linking and Embedding
(OLE) Compound File (CF) format and can be
identified by the header D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1.
These files can be analyzed by using the free
tool “Mitec Structured Storage Viewer” or by
utilizing open-source library libolecf (code.google.
com/p/libolecf/)
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(C:\Users\%User Name%\). The retrieved photoswere stored
in JPEG format while the videos were stored in MP4 file
format.
Analysis of Metro application artifacts
Metro applications do not have direct access to the file
system and all of their content is stored under (%userprofile
%\AppData\Local\Packages\%Application Name%_%id%).
Table 3 details the structure of the Metro application data
directory.
Camera Application
Artifacts left by the Camera Metro application were
found in the directory “Micro-
soft.Camera_8wekyb3d8bbwe” under the package’s direc-
tory. The Registry hive “settings.dat” was found under the
Settings directory (see Figs. 2–5). Table 4 details the data
found inside the settings registry hive.
Photo application
The photos application displays not only the local
photos stored in the Pictures directory in the user’s home
directory but also online photos stored in user’s SkyDrive.
All the online SkyDrive photos are cached to the expected
INetCache directory under the package directory (micro-
soft.windowsphotos_8wekyb3d8bbwe). As mentioned
previously these files retain their original file-names. The
photos uploaded during the case study phase of the
experiment were recovered from randomly named di-
rectories under INETCache directory.
SkyDrive application
Data related to files uploaded to SkyDrive using the
application was found in the directory (LocalState\bt\up-
loads\%User ID%\) under the package directory (micro-
soft.microsoftskydrive_ 8wekyb3d8bbwe). See Fig. 6. The
data is stored in xml files with GUID as file-name. The
following are the nodes that are of interest:
 transferGUID: Unique ID of the transaction, this id is also
used in filename.
 UserCid: Unique ID of user’s Microsoft account, this is
previouly mentioned as variable %User ID%.
 FileName: Name of file on local system, this will also be
used as name of the file on SkyDrive servers.
 destinationGroup: Name of the directory files is to be
sent to on SkyDrive server.
Bing search
Bing search artifacts were recovered from randomly
named subdirectories of the INetCache directory in the
Bing package directory (Microsoft.Bing_8wekyb3d8bbwe).
The files recovered were cached files of page search.htm,
which is called when a new search term is entered. The
cache directories also held several image files that were
Fig. 10. RecoveryState.{%GUID%}.dat file being analyzed in Mitec SSV. Two
GUIDs can be seen that indicates that two tabs were open.
Fig. 11. {B87DD755-DFF0-11E2-90F1-FA7A0AAA4087}.dat file being
analyzed in Mitec SSV.
Fig. 12. TabImage stream in file {B87DD755-DFF0-11E2-90F1-
FA7A0AAA4087}.dat. This file holds information about a single tab in
browsing session.
Fig. 13. TL0 stream in file {B87DD755-DFF0-11E2-90F1-
FA7A0AAA4087}.dat. URL is being highlighted.
Fig. 14. TL1 stream in file {B87DD755-DFF0-11E2-90F1-
FA7A0AAA4087}.dat. URL is being highlighted.
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displayed in the result of the search. These results reflected
search terms used in the case study phase of the experi-
ment see Figs. 7–9.
Analysis of Internet Explorer artifacts
Internet Explorer browser session artifacts were recov-
ered from (%userprofile%\AppData\Local\Micro-
soft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\). Table 5 details the
structure of “Recovery” directory.
Using the data found in these files, a timeline of the
user’s activity in the last browsing session was established
see Fig. 10.
Analysis of the Property Set in the file {B87DD755-
DFF0-11E2-90F1-FA7A0AAA4087}.dat indicated the last
destination of the user was the page titled “About the
University” with a corresponding URL www.zu.ac.ae/main/
en/explore_zu/index.aspx see Fig. 11.
The stream titled TabImage held the thumbnail preview
image. This image was stored in Microsoft’s proprietary
format “Windows Media Photo” (WMPHOTO). This stream
was saved as binary data and was viewed using image
viewing software IrfanView see Fig. 12
By analyzing the streams (TL%Number%) it was found
that on opening the browser, the user was directed to the
default page MSN UAE (http://uae.msn.com/?
rd¼1&dcc¼AE&opt¼0). The user then navigated to Zayed
University website’s main page (http://www.zu.ac.ae/
main/en). And from there, finally, to Zayed University
website’s “About University” page (http://www.zu.ac.ae/
main/en/explore_zu/index.aspx) see Figs. 13–15.
Similar analysis was done on second file {B87DD756-
DFF0-11E2-90F1-FA7A0AAA4087}.dat which represented
a second browser tab see Fig. 16.
All the information recovered during this analysis was
found to be consistent with the case study conducted in the
first stage of the experiment.
Conclusion and future work
The field of digital forensics is developing with the
innovation of new devices. In this research we have studied
the forensics of the Windows Surface RT tablet, which runs
the Windows RT operating system. Utilizing a vulnerability
in Windows RT code, we were able to perform the acqui-
sition of the device.1 There are a range of artifacts that could
be considered as evidencewhen forensically investigating a
Surface RT device. These artifacts can be divided as non-
Metro application artifacts and Metro application arti-
facts. In terms of non-Metro application artifacts, an
interesting artifact that was retrieved was the user’s online
and offline account password. In terms of Metro Applica-
tion artifacts, we were able to retrieve information about,
for example, the Camera Application, the Photos Applica-
tion, SkyDrive and Bing Searches.
With regard to future work, we plan to utilize the in-
formation gathered in this research to develop a tool that
will automate the process of acquisition and analysis of a
Surface RT device. Other possible futurework is to compare
the artifacts from the Surface RT with those from other
Windows RT devices to determine whether there are any
differences in the data stored on the device and their
structure.
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